A private learner is an algorithm that given a sample of labeled individual examples outputs a generalizing hypothesis while preserving the privacy of each individual. In 2008 , Kasiviswanathan et al. (FOCS 2008 gave a generic construction of private learners, in which the sample complexity is (generally) higher than what is needed for non-private learners. This gap in the sample complexity was then further studied in several followup papers, showing that (at least in some cases) this gap is unavoidable. Moreover, those papers considered ways to overcome the gap, by relaxing either the privacy or the learning guarantees of the learner.
Introduction
A private learner is an algorithm that given a sample of labeled examples, where each example represents an individual, outputs a generalizing hypothesis while preserving the privacy of each individual. This formal notion, combining the requirements of PAC learning [28] and Differential Privacy [16] , was presented in 2008 by Kasiviswanathan et al. [21] , who also gave a generic construction of private learners. However, the sample complexity of the learner of [21] is (generally) higher than what is needed for non-private learners.
This gap in the sample complexity was studied in several followup papers. For pure differential privacy, it was shown that in some cases this gap can be closed with the price of giving up proper learning -where the output hypothesis should be from the learned concept class -for improper learning. Indeed, it was shown that for the class of point functions over domain of size 2 d , the sample complexity of every proper learner is Ω(d) (matching the upper bound of [21] ), whereas there exist improper private learners with sample complexity O(1) that use pseudorandom or pairwise independent functions as their output hypotheses [6, 7] . 1 For the case of threshold functions, it was shown that with pure differential privacy even improper learners require Ω(d) samples [19] (while there exists a non-private proper learner with sample complexity O(1)).
Another approach for reducing the sample complexity of private learners is to relax the privacy requirement to approximate differential privacy. This relaxation was shown to be significant as it allows privately and properly learning point functions with O(1) sample complexity, and threshold functions with sample complexity 2 O(log * d) [8] .
In this work we examine an alternative approach, inspired by the (non-private) models of semi-supervised learning [29] (where the learning algorithm uses a small batch of labeled examples and a large batch of unlabeled examples) and active learning [23] (where the learning algorithm chooses which examples should be labeled). In both approaches, the focus is on reducing the sample complexity of labeled examples whereas it is assumed that unlabeled examples can be obtained with a significantly lower cost. In this vein, a recent work by Balcan and Feldman [4] suggested a generic conversion of active learners in the model of statistical queries [22] into learners that also provide differential privacy. For example, Balcan We present two generic constructions of private semi-supervised learners via an approach that deviates from most of the research in semi-supervised and active learning: (1) Semi-supervised learning algorithms and heuristics often rely on strong assumptions about the data, e.g., that close points are likely to be labeled similarly, that the data is clustered, or that the data lies on a low dimensional subspace of the input space. In contrast, we work in the standard PAC learning model, and need not make any further assumptions.
(2) Active learners examine their pool of unlabeled data and then choose (maybe adaptively) which data examples to label. Our learners have no control over which of the sample elements are labeled.
Our main result is that the labeled sample complexity of such learners is characterized by the VC dimension. Our first generic construction is of learners where the labeled sample complexity is proportional to the VC dimension of the concept class. However, the unlabeled sample complexity of the algorithm is as big as the representation length of domain elements. The learner for a class C starts with an unlabeled database and uses private sanitization to create a synthetic database, with roughly VC(C) points, that can answer queries in a class related to C. It then uses this database to choose a subset of the hypotheses of size 2 O(VC(C)) and then uses the exponential mechanism [24] to choose from these hypotheses using the
Preliminaries
In this section we define differential privacy and semi-supervised (private) learning. Additional preliminaries on the VC dimension and on data sanitization are deferred to the appendix.
Notation. We use O γ (g(n)) as a shorthand for O(h(γ) · g(n)) for some non-negative function h. In informal discussions, we sometimes write O(g(n)) to indicate that g(n) is missing lower order terms. We use X to denote an arbitrary domain, and X d for the domain {0, 1} d . Differential Privacy. Consider a database where each entry contains information pertaining to an individual. An algorithm operating on such databases is said to preserve differential privacy if its outcome is insensitive to any modification in a single entry. Formally: Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [16, 15] ). Databases S 1 ∈ X m and S 2 ∈ X m over a domain X are called neighboring if they differ in exactly one entry. A randomized algorithm A is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for all neighboring databases S 1 , S 2 ∈ X m , and for all sets F of outputs,
The probability is taken over the random coins of A. When δ=0 we omit it and say that A preserves pure differential privacy, otherwise (when δ > 0) we say that A preserves approximate differential privacy. In this section we focus on semi-supervised learning. Active learning will be discussed in Section 5. A concept c : X → {0, 1} is a predicate that labels examples taken from the domain X by either 0 or 1. A concept class C over X is a set of concepts (predicates) mapping X to {0, 1}. A semi-supervised learner is given n examples sampled according to an unknown probability distribution µ over X, where m ≤ n of these examples are labeled according to an unknown target concept c ∈ C. The learner succeeds if it outputs a hypothesis h that approximates the target concept well according to the distribution µ. Formally: Definition 2.2. Let c and µ be a concept and a distribution over a domain X. The generalization error of a hypothesis h :
See Appendices
When error µ (c, h) ≤ α we say that h is α-good for c and µ. [28, 29] ). Let C be a concept classes over a domain X, and let A be an algorithm operating on (partially) labeled databases. Algorithm A is an (α, β, n, m)-SSL (semi-supervised learner) for C if for all concepts c ∈ C and all distributions µ on X the following holds.
Definition 2.3 (Semi-Supervised Learning
The probability is taken over the choice of the samples from µ and the coin tosses of A.
If a semi-supervised learner is restricted to only output hypotheses from the target concept class C, then it is called a proper learner. Otherwise, it is called an improper learner. We sometimes refer to the input for a semi-supervised learner as two databases D ∈ (X × {⊥}) n−m and S ∈ (X × {0, 1}) m , where m and n are the labeled and unlabeled sample complexities of the learner.
Semi-supervised learning algorithms operate on a (partially) labeled sample with the goal of choosing a hypothesis with a small generalization error. Standard arguments in learning theory (see Appendix B) state that the generalization of a hypothesis h and its empirical error (observed on a large enough sample) are similar. Hence, in order to output a hypothesis with small generalization error it suffices to output a hypothesis with small empirical error.
Agnostic Learner. Consider an SSL for an unknown class C that uses a (known) hypotheses class H. If H = C, then a hypothesis with small empirical error might not exist in H. Such learners are referred to in the literature as agnostic-learners, and are only required to produce a hypothesis f ∈ H (approximately) minimizing error µ (c, f ), where c is the (unknown) target concept.
Definition 2.5 (Agnostic Semi-Supervised Learning). Let H be a concept classes over a domain X, and let
A be an algorithm operating on (partially) labeled databases. Algorithm A is an (α, β, n, m)-agnostic-SSL using H if for all concepts c (not necessarily in H) and all distributions µ on X the following holds.
Private Semi-Supervised PAC learning. Similarly to [21] we define private semi-supervised learning as the combination of Definitions 2.1 and 2.3. Definition 2.6 (Private Semi-Supervised Learning). Let A be an algorithm that gets an input S ∈ (X × {0, 1, ⊥}) n . Algorithm A is an (α, β, ǫ, δ, n, m)-PSSL (private SSL) for a concept class C over X if A is an (α, β, n, m)-SSL for C and A is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Active Learning. Semi-supervised learners are a subset of the larger family of active learners. Such learners can adaptively request to reveal the labels of specific examples. See formal definition and discussion in Section 5.
A Generic Construction Achieving Low Labeled Sample Complexity
We next study the labeled sample complexity of private semi-supervised learners. We begin with a generic algorithm showing that for every concept class C there exist a pure-private proper-learner with labeled sample complexity (roughly) VC(C). This algorithm, called GenericLearner, is described in Algorithm 1. The algorithm operates on a labeled database S and on an unlabeled database D. First, the algorithm produces a sanitization D of the unlabeled database D w.r.t. C ⊕ (to be defined). Afterwards, the algorithm uses D to construct a small set of hypotheses H (we will show that H contains at least one good hypothesis). Finally, the algorithm uses the exponential mechanism to choose a hypothesis out of H. Definition 3.1. Given two concepts h, f ∈ C, we denote (h⊕f ) :
To preserve the privacy of the examples in D, we first create a sanitized version of it -D. If the entries of D are drawn i.i.d. according to the underlying distribution (and if D is big enough), then a hypothesis with small empirical error on D also has small generalization error (see Theorem B.6). Our learner classifies the sanitized database D with small error, thus we require that a small error on D implies a small error on D. Specifically, if c is the target concept, then we require that for every f ∈ C,
Observe that this is exactly what we would get from a sanitization of D w.r.t. the concept class C ⊕c = {(f ⊕c) : f ∈ C}. As the target concept c is unknown, we let D be a sanitization of D w.r.t. C ⊕ , which contains C ⊕c .
To apply the sanitization of Blum et al. [10] to D w.r.t. the class C ⊕ , we analyze the VC dimension of C ⊕ in the next observation, whose proof appears in Appendix C. 
. The learner might not be efficient.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is via the construction of algorithm GenericLearner (Algorithm 1). See Appendix C for the complete proof.
Algorithm 1 GenericLearner
Input: parameter ǫ, an unlabeled database D = (x i ) n−m i=1 , and a labeled database S = (x i , y i ) m i=1 .
1. Initialize H = ∅.
Construct an
3. Let B = {b 1 , . . . , b ℓ } be the set of all (unlabeled) points appearing at least once in D.
For every
5. Choose and return h ∈ H using the exponential mechanism with inputs ǫ, H, S.
Note that the labeled sample complexity in Theorem 3.3 is optimal (ignoring the dependency in α, β, ǫ), as even without the privacy requirement every PAC learner for a class C must have labeled sample complexity Ω(VC(C)). However, the unlabeled sample complexity is as big as the representation length of domain elements, that is, O(d · VC(C)). Such a blowup in the unlabeled sample complexity is unavoidable in any generic construction of pure-private learners. 3 To show the usefulness of Theorem 3.3, we consider the concept class THRESH d defined as follows. For 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 d let c j : X d → {0, 1} be defined as c j (x) = 1 if x < j and c j (x) = 0 otherwise. Define the concept class THRESH d = {c j : 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 d }. Balcan and Feldman [4] showed an efficient pure-private proper-learner for THRESH d with labeled sample complexity O α,β,ǫ (1) and unlabeled sample complexity O α,β,ǫ (d). At the cost of preserving approximate-privacy, and using the efficient approximateprivate sanitizer for intervals from [8] (in Step 2 of Algorithm GenericLearner) instead on the sanitizer of [10] , we get the following lemma (as GenericLearner requires unlabeled examples only in Step 2, and the sanitizer of [8] requires a database of size O α,β,ǫ,δ (8 log * d )). Beimel et al. [8] showed an efficient approximate-private proper-learner for THRESH d with (both labeled and unlabeled) sample complexity O α,β,ǫ,δ (16 log * d ). The learner from Lemma 3.4 has similar unlabeled sample complexity, but improves on the labeled complexity.
Boosting the Labeled Sample Complexity of Private Learners
We now show a generic transformation of a private learning algorithm A for a class C into a private learner with reduced labeled sample complexity (roughly VC(C)), while maintaining its unlabeled sample complexity. This transformation could be applied to a proper or an improper learner, and to a learner that preserves pure or approximated privacy.
The main ingredient of the transformation is algorithm LabelBoost (Algorithm 2), where the labeled sample complexity is reduced logarithmically. In Algorithm IterLabelBoost, presented in Appendix C, we use this transformation iteratively to get our learner with label complexity O α,β,ǫ (VC(C)).
Given a partially labeled sample B of size n, algorithm LabelBoost chooses a small subset H of C that strongly depends on the points in B so outputting a hypothesis h ∈ H may breach privacy. Nevertheless, LabelBoost does choose a good hypothesis h ∈ H (using the exponential mechanism), but instead of outputting h it relabels part of the sample B using h and applies A on the relabeled sample. In Lemma 4.1, we analyze the privacy guarantees of Algorithm LabelBoost. We do not know if Algorithm LabelBoost is a learner. To achieve a learner we add sampling stages to the algorithm. This is done in Algorithm InterLabelBoost appearing Appendix C. Algorithm InterLabelBoost, in addition, also applyies Algorithm LabelBoost iteratively in order to further reduce the labeled sample complexoty.
Proof. Consider the executions of LabelBoost on two neighboring inputs S 1 •T 1 •D 1 and S 2 •T 2 •D 2 . If these two neighboring inputs differ (only) on the last portion D then the execution of LabelBoost on these neighboring inputs differs only in Step 6, and hence Inequality (1) (approximate differential privacy) follows from the privacy of A. We, therefore, assume that D 1 = D 2 = D (and that S 1 •T 1 , S 2 •T 2 differ in at most one entry).
Algorithm 2 LabelBoost
Setting: Algorithm A operating on partially labeled databases of size n.
Input: A partially labeled databases
% We assume that the first portion of B (denoted as S) contains labeled examples. Our goal is to apply A on a similar database where both S and T are labeled.
2. Let P = {p 1 , . . . , p ℓ } be the set of all points p ∈ X appearing at least once in S•T .
For every
4. Choose h ∈ H using the exponential mechanism with privacy parameter ǫ=1, solution set H, and the database S.
Relabel S•T using h, and denote this relabeled database as
Denote by H 1 , P 1 and by H 2 , P 2 the elements H, P as they are in the executions of LabelBoost on
The main difficulty in proving differential privacy is that H 1 and H 2 can significantly differ. We show, however, that the distribution on relabeled databases (S•T ) h generated in
Step 5 of the two executions are similar in the sense that for each relabeled database in one of the distributions there exist one or two databases in the other s.t. (1) all these databases have, roughly, the same probability, and (2) they differ on at most one entry. Thus, executing the differentially private algorithm A in Step 6 preserves differential privacy. We now make this argument formal.
Note that |P 1 \ P 2 | ∈ {0, 1}, and let p 1 be the element in P 1 \ P 2 if such an element exists. If this is the case, then p 1 appears exactly once in S 1 •T 1 . Similarly, let p 2 be the element in P 2 \ P 1 if such an element exists.
More specifically, for every z ∈ Π C (K) there are either one or two (but not more) hypotheses in H 1 that agree with z on K. We denote these one or two hypotheses by h 1, z and h ′ 1, z , which may be identical if only one unique hypothesis exists. Similarly, we denote h 2, z and h ′ 2, z as the hypotheses corresponding to
then the difference is clearly zero and otherwise they differ only on p i , which appears at most once in S i . Moreover, for every z ∈ Π C (K) we have that |q(S 1 , h 1, z ) − q(S 2 , h 2, z )| ≤ 1 because h 1, z and h 2, z disagree on at most two points p 1 , p 2 such that at most one of them appears in S 1 and at most one of them appears in S 2 . The same is true for every pair in
We get that for every z ∈ Π C (K),
We can now conclude the proof by noting that for every z ∈ Π C (K) the databases (
Hence, by the privacy properties of algorithm A we have that for any set F of possible outputs of algorithm LabelBoost
Consider an execution of algorithm LabelBoost on a database S•T •D, and assume that the examples in S are labeled by some target concept c ∈ C. Recall that for every possible labeling z of the elements in S and in T , algorithm LabelBoost adds to H a hypothesis from C that agrees with z. In particular, H contains a hypothesis that agrees with the target concept c on S (and on T ). That is, ∃f ∈ H s.t. error S (f ) = 0. Hence, the exponential mechanism (on Step 4) chooses (w.h.p.) a hypothesis h ∈ H s.t. error S (h) is small, provided that |S| is roughly log |H|, which is roughly VC(C) · log(|S| + |T |) by Sauer's lemma. So, algorithm LabelBoost takes an input database where only a small portion of it is labeled, and applies A a similar database in which the labeled portion grows exponentially.
It Appendix C we embed algorithm LabelBoost in a wrapper algorithm, called IterLabelBoost, that iteratively applies LabelBoost in order to enlarge the labeled portion of the database. This results in the following theorem.
. See Appendix C for the details. In a nutshell, the learner IterLabelBoost could be described as follows. It starts by training on the given labeled data. In each step, a part of the unlabeled points is labeled using the current hypothesis (previously labeled points are also relabeled); then the learner retrains using its own predictions as a (larger) labeled sample. Variants of this idea (known as self-training) have appeared in the literature for non-private learners (e.g., [27, 20, 1] Algorithm IterLabelBoost can also be used as an agnostic learner, where the target class C is unknown, and the learner outputs a hypothesis out of a set F = C. Note that given a labeled sample, a consistent hypothesis might not exist in F . Minor changes in the proof of Theorem 4.2 show the following theorem.
To show the usefulness of Theorem 4.2, we consider (a discrete version of) the class of all axisaligned rectangles (or hyperrectangles) in ℓ dimensions. Formally, let
Define the concept class of all axis-aligned rectangles over
The VC dimension of this class is 2ℓ, and, thus, it can be learned non-privately with (labeled and unlabeled) sample complexity O α,β (ℓ). The best currently known private PAC learner for this class [8] has (labeled and unlabeled) sample complexity O α,β,ǫ,δ (ℓ 3 · 8 log * (d) ). Using IterLabelBoost with the construction of [8] reduces the labeled sample complexity while maintaining the unlabeled sample complexity.
Corollary 4.5. There exists a private semi-supervised learner for RECTANGLE
The labeled sample complexity in Theorem 4.2 has no dependency in δ. 4 It would be helpful if we could also reduce the dependency on ǫ. As we will later see, this can be achieved in the active learning model. We can apply IterLabelBoost to the generic construction for private PAC learners of Kasiviswanathan et al. [21] , in which the (labeled and unlabeled) sample complexity is logarithmic in the size of the target concept class C (better constructions are known for many specific cases). Using Algorithm IterLabelBoost with their generic construction results in a private semi-supervised learner with unlabeled sample complexity (roughly) log |C|, which is better than the bound achieved by GenericLearner (whose unlabeled sample complexity is O(log |X| · VC(C))). In cases where a sample-efficient private-PAC learner is known, applying IterLabelBoost would give even better bounds.
Another difference is that (a direct use of) GenericLearner only yields pure-private proper-learners, where as IterLabelBoost could be applied to every private learner (proper or improper, preserving pure or approximated privacy). To emphasize this difference, recall that the sample complexity of pure-private improper-PAC-learners is characterized by the Representation Dimension [7] . 
Private Active Learners
Semi-supervised learners are a subset of the larger family of active learners. Such learners can adaptively request to reveal the labels of specific examples. An active learner is given access to a pool of n unlabeled examples, and adaptively chooses to label m examples.
Definition 5.1 (Active Learning [23] ). Let C be a concept classes over a domain X. Let A be an interactive (stateful) algorithm that holds an initial input database D = (x i ) n i=1 ∈ (X) n . For at most m rounds, algorithm A outputs an index i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and receives an answer y i ∈ {0, 1}. Afterwards, algorithm A outputs a hypothesis h, and terminates.
Algorithm A is an (α, β, n, m)-AL (Active learner) for C if for all concepts c ∈ C and all distribu- , if x 5 = x 9 = p then instead of asking for the label of p, algorithm A asks for the label example 5 (or 9). This deviation from the standard definition is because when privacy is introduced, every entry in D corresponds to a single individual, and can be changed arbitrarily (and regardless of the other entries).
Definition 5.3 (Private Active Learner [4] ). An algorithm A is an (α, β, ǫ, δ, n, m)-PAL (Private Active Learner) for a concept class C if Algorithm A is an (α, β, n, m)-active learner for C and A is (ǫ, δ)differentially private, where in the definition of privacy we consider the input of A to be a fully labeled sample S = (x i , y i ) n i=1 ∈ (X × {0, 1}) n (and limit the number of labels y i it can access to m). Note that the queries an active learner makes depend on individual data and hence, if exposed, may breach privacy. An example of how such an exposure may occur is a medical research of a new disease -a hospital may posses background information about individuals and hence can access a large pool of unlabeled examples, but to label an example a medical test is needed. Partial information about the labeling queries would hence be leaked to the tested individuals. More information about the queries may be leaked to an observer of the testing site. The following definition remedies this potential breach of privacy.
Definition 5.4. We define the transcript in an execution of an active learner A as the ordered sequence L = (ℓ i ) m i=1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} m of indices that A outputs throughout the execution. We say that a learner A is (ǫ, δ)-transcript-differentially private if the algorithm whose input is the labeled sample and whose output is the output of A together with the transcript of the execution is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. An algorithm A is an (α, β, ǫ, δ, n, m)-TPAL (transcript-private active-learner) for a concept class C if Algorithm A is an (α, β, n, m)-Active learner for C and A is (ǫ, δ)-transcript-differentially private.
Recall that a semi-supervised learner has no control over which of its examples are labeled, and the indices of the labeled examples are publicly known. Hence, a private semi-supervised learner is, in particular, a transcript-private active learner.
Theorem 5.5. If A is an (α, β, ǫ, δ, n, m)-PSSL, then A is an (α, β, ǫ, δ, n, m)-TPAL.
In particular, our algorithms from Sections 3 and 4 satisfy Definition 5.4, suggesting that the strong privacy guarantees of Definition 5.4 are achievable. See Appendix C for a discussion about Definition 5.4. The private active learners presented in [4] as well as the algorithm described in the next section only satisfy the weaker Definition 5.3.
Removing the Dependency on the Privacy Parameters
We next show how to transform a semi-supervised private learner A into an active learner B with better privacy guarantees without increasing the labeled sample complexity. Algorithm B, on input an unlabeled database D, randomly chooses a subset of the inputs D ′ ⊆ D and asks for the labels of the examples in D ′ (denote the resulting labeled database as S). Algorithm B then applies A on D, S. As the next claim states, this eliminates the 1 ǫ factor from the labeled sample complexity as the (perhaps adversarial) choice for the input database is independent of the queries chosen.
Claim 5.6. If there exists an (α, β, ǫ * , δ, n, m)-PSSL for a concept class C, then for every ǫ there exists an α, β, ǫ, 7+e ǫ * 3+e 2ǫ * ǫδ, t, m -PAL (private active learner) for C, where t = n ǫ (3 + exp(2ǫ * )).
The proof of Claim 5.6 is similar to the sub-sampling technique for boosting the privacy parameters [21, 5] (see Appendix C for the details). This transformation preserves the efficiency of the base (non-active) learner. Hence, a given (efficient) non-active private learner for a class C could always be transformed into an (efficient) active private learner whose labeled sample complexity does not depend on ǫ. Applying Claim 5.6 to the learner from Theorem 4.2 result in the following theorem, showing that the labeled sample complexity of private active learners has no dependency in the privacy parameters ǫ and δ.
A Some Differentially Private Mechanisms

A.1 The Exponential Mechanism [24]
We next describe the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [24] . We present its private learning variant; however, it can be used in more general scenarios. The goal here is to chooses a hypothesis h ∈ H approximately minimizing the empirical error. The choice is probabilistic, where the probability mass that is assigned to each hypothesis decreases exponentially with its empirical error. For every ∆ > 0, the probability that the exponential mechanism outputs a hypothesis h such that error S (h) >ê + ∆ is at most |H| · exp(−ǫ∆m/2).
A.2 Data Sanitization
Given a database S = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) containing elements from some domain X, the goal of data sanitization is to output (while preserving differential privacy) another databaseŜ that is in some sense similar to S. This returned databaseŜ is called a sanitized database, and the algorithm computingŜ is called a sanitizer.
For a concept c : X → {0, 1} define Q c : X * → [0, 1] as Q c (S) = 1 |S| · {i : c(x i ) = 1} . That is, Q c (S) is the fraction of the entries in S that satisfy c. A sanitizer for a concept class C is a differentially private algorithm that given a database S outputs a databaseŜ s.t. Q c (S) ≈ Q c (Ŝ) for every c ∈ C. [10] ). Let C be a class of concepts mapping X to {0, 1}. Let A be an algorithm that on an input database S ∈ X * outputs another databaseŜ ∈ X * . Algorithm A is an (α, β, ǫ, δ, m)sanitizer for predicates in the class C, if 1. A is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private; 2. For every input S ∈ X m , the size of the database m satisfies:
Definition A.2 (Sanitization
The probability is over the coin tosses of algorithm A. As before, when δ=0 (pure privacy) we omit it from the set of parameters.
Theorem A.3 (Blum et al. [10] ). For any class of predicates C over a domain X, and any parameters α, β, ǫ, there exists an (α, β, ǫ, m)-sanitizer for C, provided that the size of the database m satisfies:
The returned sanitized database contains O( VC(C) α 2 log( 1 α )) elements. Sauer's lemma bounds the cardinality of Π C (B) in termes of VC(C) and |B|.
B The Vapnik-Chervonenkis Dimension
Theorem B.2 ([26] ). Let C be a concept class over a domain X, and let B ⊆ X such that |B| > VC(C).
It holds that
Π C (B) ≤ e|B| VC(C) VC(C) .
B.1 VC Bounds
Classical results in computational learning theory state that a sample of size θ(VC(C)) is both necessary and sufficient for the PAC learning of a concept class C. The following two theorems give upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity. Hence, an algorithm that takes a sample of m = Ω α,β (VC(C)) labeled examples and outputs a concept h ∈ C that agrees with the sample is a PAC learner for C. The following is a simple generalization of Theorem B.4.
Theorem B.5 (VC-Dimension Generalization Bound)
. Let C and µ be a concept class and a distribution over a domain X. Let α, β > 0, and m ≥ 48
The above theorem generalizes Theorem B.4 in two aspects. First, it holds simultaneously for every pair c, h ∈ C, where as in Theorem B.4 the target concept c is fixed before generating the sample. Second, Theorem B.4 only ensures that a hypothesis h has small generalization error if error S (h) = 0. In Theorem B.5 on the other hand, this is guaranteed even if error S (h) is small (but non-zero).
The next theorem handles (in particular) the agnostic case, in which the concept class C is unknown and the learner uses a hypotheses class H. In particular, given a labeled sample S there may be no h ∈ H for which error S (h) is small. Theorem B.6 (VC-Dimension Agnostic Generalization Bound [3, 2] 
Notice that the sample size in Theorem B.6 is larger than the sample size in Theorem B.5, where, basically, the former is proportional to 1 α 2 and the latter is proportional to 1 α .
C Omitted Proofs
C.1 Proving the Correctness of Algorithm GenericLearner
Let C be a concept class over X d , and let Proof. First note that for every Proof. Note that GenericLearner only accesses D via a sanitizer, and only accesses S using the exponential mechanism (on Step 5). As each of those two mechanisms is ǫ-differentially private, and as D and S are two disjoint samples, GenericLearner is ǫ-differentially private. We, thus, only need to prove that with high probability the learner returns a good hypothesis. Fix a target concept c ∈ C and a distribution µ over X, and define the following three "good" events: We first observe that when these three events happen algorithm GenericLearner returns an α-good hypothesis: For every (y 1 , . . . , y ℓ ) ∈ Π C (B), algorithm GenericLearner adds to H a hypothesis f s.t. ∀1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, f (b i ) = y i . In particular, H contains a hypothesis h * s.t. h * (x) = c(x) for every x ∈ B, that is, a hypothesis h * s.t. error D (h * , c) = 0. As event E 1 has occur we have that this h * satisfies error S (h * ) ≤ 3α 5 . Thus, event E 1 ∩ E 2 ensures that algorithm GenericLearner chooses (using the exponential mechanism) a hypothesis h ∈ H s.t. error S (h) ≤ 4α 5 . Event E 3 ensures, therefore, that this h satisfies error µ (c, h) ≤ α. We will now show E 1 ∩ E 2 ∩ E 3 happens with high probability.
Standard arguments in learning theory state that (w.h.p.) the empirical error on a (large enough) random sample is close to the generalization error (see Theorem B.6). Specifically, by setting n and m to be at least 1250 α 2 VC(C) ln( 25 αβ ), Theorem B.6 ensures that with probability at least (1 − 2 5 β), for every h ∈ C the following two inequalities hold.
Note that Event E 3 occurs whenever Inequality (2) holds (since H ⊆ C). Moreover, by setting the size of the unlabeled database (n − m) to be at least
In particular, for every h ∈ C it holds that
Therefore (using Inqeualities (2),(3),(4) and the triangle inequality), Event E 1 ∩ E 3 occurs with probability at least (1 − 3β 5 ). The exponential mechanism ensures that the probability of event E 2 is at least 1 − |H| · exp(−ǫαm/10) (see Proposition A.1). Note that log |H| ≤ |B| ≤ | D| = O VC(C)
, Event E 2 occurs with probability at least (1 − β 5 ).
All in all, by setting m ≥ O VC(C)
, we ensure that the probability of GenericLearner failing to output an α-good hypothesis is at most β.
C.2 Proving the Correctness of Algorithm LabelBoost and Algorithm IterLabelBoost
In this section we present the iterative version of algorithm LabalBoost, and proove its proerties (stated in Theorem 4.2). Consider algorithm IterLabelBoost (Algorithm 4). Recall that applying algorithm LabelBoost on an algorithm A reduces the labeled sample complexity (logarithmically). Basically, Algorithm IterLabelBoost simply applies labelBoost iteratively in order to further reduce the labeled sample complexity. Every such application deteriorates the privacy parameters, and hence, every iteration includes a sub-sampling step, which compensates for those privacy losses.
Before analyzing algorithm IterLabelBoost we recall the sub-sampling technique from [21, 5] .
Claim C.1 ([21, 5] ). Let A be an (ǫ * , δ)-differentially private algorithm operating on databases of size n. Fix ǫ ≤ 1, and denote t = n ǫ (3 + exp(ǫ * )). Construct an algorithm B that on input a database
uniformly at random selects a subset J ⊆ {1, 2, ..., t} of size n, and runs A on the multiset
Remark C.2. In Claim C.1 we assume that A treats its input as a multiset. If this is not the case, then algorithm B should be modified to randomly shuffle the elements in D J before applying A on D j .
Claim C.1 boosts privacy by selecting random elements from the database and ignoring the rest of the database. The intuition is simple: Fix two neighboring databases D, D ′ differing (only) on their i th entry. If the i th entry is ignored (which happens with high probability), then the executions on D and on D ′ are the same (i.e., perfect privacy). Otherwise, (ǫ * , δ)-privacy is preserved.
In algorithm IterLabelBoost we apply the learner A on a database containing n i.i.d. samples from the database S (Steps 4). Consider two neighboring databases D, D ′ differing on their i th entry. Unlike in Claim C.1, the risk is that this entry will appear several times in the database on which A is executed. As the next claim states, the affects on the privacy guarantees are small. The intuition is that the probability of the i th entry appearing "too many" times is negligible. 
Algorithm 5 B
Inputs: Algorithm A and a database D = (x i ) n i=1 .
1. Uniformly at random select V = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ), where each v i is chosen i.i.d. from {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Let
Let v ∈ {1, . . . , n} n be s.t. the number of appearances of i in v is ℓ, and let w ∈ ({1, . . . , n} \ {i}) ℓ . We denote by v w the vector v where every appearance of i in it is replaced with its corresponding entry from w. For example, if i = 5 and v = (9, 2, 5, 8, 5, 4, 2, 5, 1), then for w = (2, 9, 4) we get v w = (9, 2, 2, 8, 9, 4, 2, 4, 1) . Moreover, let W ℓ denote a random w ∈ ({1, . . . , n} \ {i}) ℓ .
Note that for every ℓ, every choice for v w appears in the above sum exactly n ℓ times (as the number of choice for a matching v). Therefore, For ǫ ≤ 1 we get that
We next prove the privacy properties of algorithm IterLabelBoost.
Proof. We think of the input of IterLabelBoost as one database B ∈ (X × {0, 1, ⊥}) 90000n+m . Note that the number of iterations performed on neighboring databases is identical (determined by the parameters α, β, n, m), and denote this number as N . Throughout the execution, random elements from the input database are deleted (on Step 2c). Note however, that the size of the database at any moment throughout the execution does not depend on the database content (determined by the parameters α, β, n, m). We denote the size of the database at the beginning of the i th iteration as n(i), e.g., n(1) = 90000n + m. Let L t denote an algorithm similar to IterLabelBoost, except that only the last t iterations are performed. The input of L t is a database in (X × {0, 1, ⊥}) n(N −t+1) . We next show (by induction on t) that L t is (1, 41δ)-differentially private. To this end, note that an execution of L 0 consists sub-sampling (as in Claim C.1), i.i.d. sampling (as in Claim C.3), and applying the (1, δ)-private algorithm A. By Claim C.3, steps 4-5 preserve (ln(244), 2476)-differential privacy, and, hence, by Claim C.1, we have that L 0 is (1, 41δ)-differentially private.
Assume that L t−1 is (1, 41δ)-differentially private, and observe that L t could be restated as an algorithm that first performs one iteration of algorithm IterLabelBoost and then applies L t−1 on the databases D, S as they are at the end of that iteration. Now fix two neighboring databases B 1 , B 2 and consider the execution of L t on B 1 and on B 2 .
Step 2b of the first iteration of L t on B 1 and on B 2 (note that
. If B 1 and B 2 differ (only) on their last portion, denoted as D b 1 , D b 2 , then the execution of L t on these neighboring inputs differs only in the execution of L t−1 , and hence Inequality (1) (approximate differential privacy) follows from the privacy of L t−1 . We, therefore, assume that
differ in at most one entry). Now, note that L t begins by subsampling 1 100 fraction of the elements in S b 1 and in T b 1 (or in S b 2 and in T b 2 ). Denote the resulting databases (i.e., the databases S, T as they are after Step 2c) as S c 1 , T c 1 (and as S c 2 , T c 2 ). Let L ′ t denote an algorithm similar to L t except without Step 2c (L ′ t operates on partially labeled databases of size |S c 1 | + |T c 2 | + |D b 1 |). By Claim C.1, it suffices to show that L ′ t is (4, 590δ)-differentially private. Finally, note that L ′ t is identical to LabelBoost with L t−1 as the base learner. As L t−1 is (1, 41δ)-differentially private, Lemme 4.1 states that L ′ t is (4, 446δ)-differentially private.
Before proceeding with the utility analysis, we introduce to following notations.
Notation. Consider the i th iteration of IterLabelBoost. We let S i and T i denote the elements S, T as they are after Step 2c, and let h i denote the the hypothesis h chosen on Step 2g.
Claim C.5. With probability at least
Proof. Let H i , P i denote the elements H, P as they are in the i th iteration, and note that by Sauer's lemma,
For every (z 1 , . . . , z ℓ ) ∈ Π C (P i ), algorithm IterLabelBoost adds to H i a hypothesis f s.t. ∀1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, f (p j ) = z j . In particular, H i contains a hypothesis f * s.t. error S i (f * ) = 0. Hence, Proposition A.1 (properties of the exponential mechanism) ensures that the probability of the exponential mechanism choosing an h i s.t. error S i (h i ) > α i is at most
Claim C.6. Let IterLabelBoost be executed with a base learner with sample complexity n, and on databases D, S. If |D| ≥ 90000n, then IterLabelBoost never fails on Step 2b.
Proof. Let T b i denote the database T as it is after Step 2b of the i th iteration, and denote the number of iterations throughout the execution as N . We need to show that
Notation. We use exp [i] (·) to denote the outcome of i repeated applications of the function exp(·). For example, exp [0] (3) = 3, and exp [2] (3) = e e 3 .
Claim C.7. Fix α, β. Let IterLabelBoost be executed on a base learner with sample complexity n, and on databases D, S, where |D| ≥ 90000n and |S| ≥ 576000 α VC(C) log( 768 αβ ). In every iteration i
Proof. The proof is by induction on i. Note that the base case (for i = 1) trivially holds, and assume that the claim holds for i − 1. We have that
Recall that the loop of Step 2 in Algorithm IterLabelBoost stops when S ≥ 300n. Hence, the above claim implies the following corollary. Proof. The proof is by induction on i. Note that for i = 1 we have that S 1 contains 120 α 1 VC(C) log( 2 α 1 β 1 ) i.i.d. samples from µ that are labeled by the target concept c. By Claim C.5, with probability at least (1 − β 1 ), we have that error S 1 (h 1 ) ≤ α 1 . In that case, Theorem B.5 (the VC dimension bound) states that with probability at least (1 − β 1 ) it holds that error µ (c, h 1 ) ≤ 12α 1 . Now assume that the claim holds for (i − 1), and consider the i th iteration. Note that S i contains i.i.d. samples from µ that are labeled by h i−1 . Moreover, by Claim C.7, we have that |S i | ≥ 40 α i VC(C) log( 2 α i β i ). By Claim C.5, with probability at least (1 − β i ), we have that error S i (h i ) ≤ α i . If that is the case, Theorem B.5 states that with probability at least (1 − β i ) it holds that error µ (h i−1 , h i ) ≤ 12α i . So, with probability at least (1 − 2β i ) we have that error µ (h i−1 , h i ) ≤ 12α i . Using the inductive assumption, the probability that error µ (c, Consider the last iteration of Algorithm IterLabelBoost (say i = N ) on these inputs. The intuition is that after the last iteration, when reaching Step 4, the database S is big enough s.t. A returns (w.h.p.) a hypothesis with small error on S. This hypothesis also has small generalization error as S is labeled by h N which is close to the target concept (by Claim C.9).
Formally, let S 3 denote the database S as it after Step 3 of the execution, and let h fin denote the hypothesis returned by the base learner A on Step 5. By the while condition on Step 2, we have that |S 3 | ≥ n. Hence, by the utility guarantees of the base learner A, with probability at least (1 − β ′ ) we have that error S 3 (h fin ) ≤ α ′ . As |S 3 | ≥ 1 300 |S| ≥ 1920 α VC(C) log( 768 αβ ), and as S 3 contains i.i.d. samples from µ labeled by h N , Theorem B.5 states that with probability at least (1 − β 2 ) it holds that error µ (h fin , h N ) ≤ α 2 . By Claim C.9, with probability at least
All in all (using the triangle inequality), with probability at least
Combining Lemma C.4 and Lemma C.10 we get the following theorem. 
C.3 A Lower Bound for Transcript-Private Active-Learners
Recall Definition 5.4 from Section 5.
Definition 5. 4 We define the transcript in an execution of an active learner A as the ordered sequence L = (ℓ i ) m i=1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} m of indices that A outputs throughout the execution. We say that a learner A is (ǫ, δ)-transcript-differentially private if the algorithm whose input is the labeled sample and whose output is the output of A together with the transcript of the execution is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. An algorithm A is an (α, β, ǫ, δ, n, m)-TPAL (transcript-private active-learner) for a concept class C if Algorithm A is an (α, β, n, m)-Active learner for C and A is (ǫ, δ)-transcript-differentially private.
As mentioned in Section 5, our algorithms from Sections 3 and 4 satisfy Definition 5.4, suggesting that the strong privacy guarantees of Definition 5.4 are achievable. However, as we will now see, this comes with a price. The work on (non-private) active learning has mainly focused on reducing the dependency of the labeled sample complexity in α (the approximation parameter). The classic result in this regime states that the labeled sample complexity of learning THRESH d is O(log( 1 α )), exhibiting an exponential improvement over the Ω( 1 α ) labeled sample complexity in the non-active model. As the next theorem states the labeled sample complexity of every transcript-private active-learner for THRESH d is lower bounded by Ω( 1 α ). Theorem C.12. For every (α, β, ǫ, δ, n, m)-TPAL for THRESH d it holds that m = Ω 1 α . Proof. Let A be an (α, β, ǫ, δ, n, m)-TPAL for THRESH d . Without loss of generality, we can assume that n ≥ 100 α 2 ln( 1 αβ ) (since A can ignore part of the sample). Denote B = {0, 1, . . . , 8αn}, and consider the following thought experiment for randomly generating a labeled sample of size n.
1. Let D = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) denote the outcome of n uniform iid draws from X d .
2. Uniformly at random choose t ∈ B, and let c t ∈ THRESH d be s.t. c t (x) = 1 iff x < t.
3. Return S = (x i , c t (x i )) n i=1 .
The above process induces a distribution on labeled samples of size n, denoted as P. Let S ∼ P, and consider the execution of A on S. Recall that A operates on the unlabeled portion of S and actively queries for labels.
We first show that A must (w.h.p.) ask for the label of at least one example in B. To this end, note that even given the labels of all x / ∈ B, the target concept is distributed uniformly on B, and the probability that A fails to output an α-good hypothesis is at least 3 4 Thus, A asks for the label of a point in B with probability at least (1 − 4 3 β). Let b denote the the number of elements from B in the database S. Standard arguments in learning theory (see Theorem B.6) state that with all but β probability it holds that 7αn ≤ b ≤ 9αn. We continue with the proof assuming that this is the case. Now choose a random x * from S s.t. x * ∈ B. Note that 
.
Choose a randomx from S (uniformly), and construct a labeled sample S ′ by swapping the entries (x * , c(x * )) and (x, c(x)) in S. Note that S ′ is also distributed according to P, and thatx is a uniformly random element of S ′ . Therefore, Pr S,x * ,x,A A(S ′ ) asks for the label ofx ≤ m n .
As S and S ′ differ in at most 2 entries, differential privacy states that m n ≥ Pr Solving for m, this yields m = Ω( 1 α ).
C.4 Removing the Dependency on the Privacy Parameters
Claim 5.6. If there exists an (α, β, ǫ * , δ, n, m)-PSSL for a concept class C, then for every ǫ there exists an α, β, ǫ, 7+e ǫ * 3+e 2ǫ * ǫδ, t, m -PAL (private active learner) for C ,where t = n ǫ (3 + exp(2ǫ * )).
Algorithm 6 SubSampling
Inputs: Base learner A, privacy parameters ǫ * , ǫ, and a database D = (x i ) t i=1 of t unlabeled examples.
